Socrates, antisthenes and the problem of inherence

Abstract

Antisthenes, a disciple of Socrates and the founder of Cynics, is known in the history of logics by his paradoxical theses about the impossibility of lying, contradiction and definition. This seems to be in opposition with the conceptual basis of philosophy that was laid down by Socrates. This paper, however, indicates a possibility for reconciliation between the theses of Anthistenes and the teachings of Socrates in two points. First, Socrates never endorsed a strict, formal definition of a concept, but rather a conceptual knowledge of the nature of the object of thought. Second, the theses of Anthistenes were never anti-conceptual, they were, in fact, Antisthenes' response to the classical problem of inherence, the problem of attributing multiple predicates to one subject. Therefore, Anthistenes did not oppose the concept in itself, but rather the definition as a way of positioning a concept within the hierarchy of genera and species. He claimed that a simple object can only be named, thereby referring to the experience of the object, whereas a composite object can only be analyzed down to constituent elements. These theses in no way contradict Socrates nor his idea that ignorance ought never be displayed as knowledge.